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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the effects of exchange-rate policies in an overlapping-generations 
small open economy facing perfect capital mobility. We find that a once-and-for-all 
devaluation spurs wealth formation and leads to a current account surplus, while a 
sustained increase in the rate of devaluation leaves nonhuman wealth and the current 
account balance unperturbed. Our results differ substantially from those obtained in 
homologous small open economies with infinite horizons. 
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the consequences of exchange-rate policies on wealth
formation and the current account balance in a non-altruistic life-cycle small
open economy facing perfect capital mobility and operating under a crawling-
peg exchange-rate regime. We find that a once-and-for-all devaluation spurs
wealth formation and leads to a current account surplus, while a rise in the
rate of devaluation leaves nonhuman wealth and the current account balance
unperturbed.
Our results diﬀer substantially from those obtained in infinite-lived small
open economies perfectly integrated with the world financial market. The
analysis of the exchange-rate policies based on representative agent models
has been carried out, for example, by Obstfeld (1981), Mansoorian (1996),
and Moshin (2004). By considering agents with an endogenous rate of time
preference à la Uzawa (1968), Obstfeld (1981) discovers that an exchange-
rate devaluation is neutral for the current account dynamics, while an in-
crease in the rate of devaluation generates a current account surplus. In the
Obstfeld (1981) analysis, the current account invariance with respect to a
simple devaluation is a manifestation of the neutrality of monetary policy.
The positive eﬀect of a sustained increase in the rate of devaluation on the
external balance, instead, derives from a portfolio reallocation mechanism
combined with the nonsuperneutrality of money (due to intertemporally de-
pendent preferences); in fact, an increase in the devaluation rate, i.e. a hike
in the inflation tax, causes saving to be reallocated away from real money
balances towards the alternative asset, i.e. a foreign interest yielding asset.
Consumption initially declines, implying a current account surplus, which
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over time leads to an accumulation of foreign asset. The decline of real
money balances, by lowering agent utility and hence the subjective discount
rate, implies higher long-run consumption so as to leave the rate of time
discount (pinned down by the exogenous world interest rate) invariant.1
Mansoorian (1996) discovers, by incorporating habit-persistent prefer-
ences in the context studied by Obstfeld (1981), that a rise in the devaluation
rate causes a current account deficit, if preferences are adjacent complemen-
tary, namely, if the marginal utility of consumption is strongly increasing in
the habitual standard of living; the same qualitative results as in Obstfeld
(1981) are registered, instead, if preferences are not adjacent complementary.
In the Mansoorian (1996) analysis, like in the Obstfeld one, a one-time de-
valuation has no eﬀect on the current account. Mohsin (2004) confirms the
Obstfeld (1981) findings on the currency devaluations by assuming that the
subjective discount rate depends positively on financial wealth.
As we will show below, the consideration of the overlapping-generations
demographics overturns the Obstfeld (1981), Moshin (2004) and, to a lower
extent, Mansoorian (1996) results. Two crucial assumptions underpin our
findings: the generational diversity of agents, on the one hand, and interest-
1The Obstfeld (1981) analysis departs, in terms of setup and results, from the contribu-
tion of Calvo (1981), which investigates the eﬀects of exchange-rate policies in a financially
autarchic small open economy. In a representative agent model where money is the only
asset, Calvo (1981) obtains that a simple currency devaluation improves the balance of
payments, whereas an increase in the rate of devaluation deteriorates the balance of pay-
ments. In the Calvo (1981) analysis, the absence of a foreign interest yielding asset, as an
alternative to money balances, precludes the consideration of portfolio shifts induced by
the exchange-rate policies. See Dornbusch and Giovannini (1990) for a clear explanation
of the mechanisms that support the Calvo (1981) and Obstfeld (1981) findings.
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yielding foreign-exchange reserves that enter the government budget con-
straint, on the other. A devaluation of the exchange-rate, by raising the cen-
tral bank reserves and hence government interest proceeds, increases trans-
fer payments received by the private sector, thereby redistributing resources
across age-heterogeneous generations, stimulating saving, and improving the
current account. The absence of such a redistributive mechanism due to the
invariance of government entitlements, instead, determines that there are no
consequences on wealth formation and the current account in the case of a
rate of devaluation shift.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ana-
lytical setup; section 3 analyzes the steady state and dynamic consequences
of the currency devaluation in levels and rates; section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an intergenerational monetary small open economy, having free
access to a perfect world capital market, producing a single tradable good,
and operating under a crawling-peg exchange-rate regime. In this economy,
purchasing power parity holds as domestic output is perfectly substitutable
with the foreign produced good, i.e. P = EP ∗, where P is the domestic
price level, E the nominal exchange rate (i.e. the domestic currency price of
foreign currency), and P ∗ the foreign price level expressed in foreign currency.
The monetary authority allows the nominal exchange rate to depreciate at
a constant rate ε; the currency devaluation rate coincides with domestic
inflation, assuming zero foreign inflation.
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Private wealth is composed of real money balances, m, and interest-
bearing foreign bonds, b, whose rate of return is the exogenous world interest
rate ρ. In this economy, foreign assets, f , are given by interest-yielding cen-
tral bank reserves, r, and foreign bonds, i.e. f = r + b; the rate of return
earned by holding foreign reserves is ρ. We assume the absence of the bank-
ing sector; hence, the money supply, namely, the monetary base, is given
by domestic credit, d, and foreign reserves: m = d + r. As we consider a
managed-float exchange-rate regime and assume that no sterilization policies
are implemented by the monetary authority, the stock of domestic credit in
real terms is fixed, i.e. d =
∼
d, while r adjusts endogenously according to the
balance of payments imbalances so that any pressure on the exchange-rate is
eliminated. Domestic output is exogenous.
The consumers’ behavior is described through the OLG apparatus with
uncertain lifetime and no bequest motives formulated by Yaari (1965) and
Blanchard (1985). In this demographic setup, agents face a constant mor-
tality rate θ when they are alive. As the birth rate is assumed to equal the
death rate, the population, composed of cohorts of all ages, remains con-
stant. Money balances are inserted into the household utility function a` la
Sidrauski.
The consumer-side of the economy is described by the following aggregate
relationships2
.
c= (ρ− δ)c− αθ(θ + δ)(m+ b), (1a)
2The demand-side (1) is based on the assumption of logarithmic individual preferences.
Details on the derivation of system (1) are relegated to the Appendix.
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m =
(1− α)c
α(ρ+ ε)
, (1b)
.
m +
.
b= ρb+ y + τ − εm− c, (1c)
where c is consumption, δ the exogenous rate of time preference, α a positive
preference parameter, y the given domestic output level and τ government
lump-sum transfers.
Equation (1a) describes the Blanchard-Yaari law for consumption growth;
since nonhuman wealth m+ b is considered to be strictly positive, the condi-
tion ρ > δ must hold. Equation (1b) represents the demand for money, while
(1c) the private sector’s budget constraint.
The government and the central bank are consolidated. The government
runs a balanced-budget policy. Revenues from interest-income earned by
holding foreign reserves and seigniorage are used to finance lump-sum trans-
fers to consumers; that is,
ρr + εm = τ . (2)
We assume that the government budget is balanced through the endogenous
accommodation of τ .
The equation for the current account, which dictates the foreign asset
dynamics, is
.
f= y − c+ ρf. (3)
Consider the dynamic properties of the model. Substituting the expres-
sion m + b = f+
∼
d into (1a), and expressing this equation in terms of
deviations from the steady state equilibrium, we obtain
5
.
c= (ρ− δ)(c− c)− αθ(θ + δ)(f− f). (4a)
Equation (4a) is depicted in the phase diagram of Fig.1 for
.
c= 0; the
.
c= 0
locus is upward-sloping.
Taking (3) in terms of deviations from the long-run equilibrium yields
.
f= −(c− c) + ρ(f− f). (4b)
The
.
f= 0 locus slopes upwards in the c− f space of Fig. 1.
Since c is a jump variable and f a backward-looking one, saddle-point
stability requires, as a necessary and suﬃcient condition, that the two eigen-
values of the dynamic system (4a)-(4b) have opposite signs. For this condi-
tion to be satisfied, it is required that αθ(θ + δ) > ρ(ρ− δ); this inequality
holds if we reasonably assume that y > ρ
∼
d.3 Diagrammatically speaking,
saddle-point stability implies that the
.
c= 0 locus is steeper than the
.
f= 0
locus. The saddle-path SS, positively sloped, has a slope that lies in between
the slopes of the
.
c= 0 and
.
f= 0 loci (see Fig. 1).4
[Insert Fig. 1]
3Note that the hypothesis of finite horizons, i.e. θ > 0, guarantees the existence of a
well-defined steady state of a small open economy, having a fixed discount rate and facing
perfect capital mobility; in the Obstfeld (1981) analysis, instead, it is the consideration
of an endogenous rate of time preference that makes it possible to avoid a dynamically
degenerate steady state; see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), and Turnovsky (1997).
4The equation of the saddle-path SS is given by
c =c +(ρ− η1)(f− f),
where η1 < 0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of the dynamic system (4a)-(4b).
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3 Exchange-rate policies
In this section, we analyze the steady state and dynamic consequences of the
following shifts:
1) a once-and-for-all devaluation, i.e. a parametric increase in E;
2) a sustained increase in the rate of devaluation ε.
3.1 A once-and-for-all devaluation
Consider the long-run eﬀects of a rise in the level of the nominal exchange
rate. The long-run model can be written as
c=
αθ(θ + δ)
(ρ− δ) (f +
∼
d), (5a)
c= y + ρ f, (5b)
r +
∼
d=
(1− α) c
α(ρ+ ε)
. (5c)
Lump-sum transfers, which can be expressed as τ=
(1− α) c
α
− ρ
∼
d, are
solved residually.5
5Note that, in the long-run, the Obstfeld (1981) model corresponds to system (5) once
(5a) is replaced by the following relationship
c= Φ(m), Φ3 < 0, (5a’)
where m=r +
∼
d. This equation is obtained by solving the ”modified golden rule” with
an endogenous rate of time preference à la Uzawa (1968) — i.e. δ(cαm1−α) = ρ, where
δ3 > 0 — for consumption. In such a model, (5a’) and (5c) jointly determine c and m, while
7
A rise in E implies, for a given stock of domestic credit in nominal terms
D, a drop in
∼
d=
D
E
. The currency devaluation expands, through the fall in
∼
d,
consumption, foreign assets, and nonhuman wealth.6 The higher consump-
tion in turn increases real money balances and the stock of the central bank
reserves. Despite the foreign asset increase, an unambiguous reduction in
the foreign bond holdings takes place.7 Since government revenues obtained
from foreign reserve holdings and the inflation tax are pulled up, transfer
payments from the government to the private sector expand.
The consequences of the increase in E on nonhuman wealth and consump-
tion have an intergenerational ratio, imputable to the change of lump-sum
transfers from the government. The rise in τ causes an income redistrib-
ution from the older generations to the younger ones. Aggregate saving is
spurred, as the younger generations have a higher propensity to save than
the older ones, and therefore the stock of nonhuman wealth and consumption
are increased. The chronological disconnection of generations and the rise in
government transfer payments render money non-neutral.8
(5b) determines f , once c is known. The steady state mechanics of the Obstfeld findings
are as follows. Since (5a’), (5b) and (5c) are independent of E, consumption, real money
balances m, and foreign assets are unaltered by a simple devaluation shift. A rise in the
devaluation rate ε, instead, by decreasing real money balances and raising, through (5a’),
consumption and, through (5c), foreign assets, renders money non-superneutral.
6The relative steady state multipliers are:
d c
d
∼
d
= − αθ(θ + δ)
[αθ(θ + δ)− ρ(ρ− δ)] < 0;
d f
d
∼
d
=
1
ρ
d c
d
∼
d
< 0;
d( m + b)
d
∼
d
=
(ρ− δ)
αθ(θ + δ)
d c
d
∼
d
< 0;
where d
∼
d= −
∼
d
E
dE< 0.
7The foreign bond multiplier is:
d b
d
∼
d
=
(ρ− δ) b
[αθ(θ + δ)− ρ(ρ− δ)](m + b)
>0.
8The absence of such an intergenerational redistribution, due to the consideration of
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Consider the short-run dynamics after an unexpected permanent rise in
E occurs. Fig. 1 can be used to describe the comparative dynamics. The
initial equilibrium is at A0 and the new one at A1. As the saddle-path shifts
downward after the unexpected devaluation occurs,9 consumption suddenly
falls.10
The unexpected drop in the real money supply, due to the reduction in the
stock of domestic credit in real terms, abruptly causes an excess demand for
money (only attenuated by the fall in the real money demand, deriving from
the downward jump of consumption). In order to eliminate the pressures on
the exchange-rate, the central bank must buy foreign bonds and issue money
until the money market equilibrium is restored. Consequently, the stock of
foreign reserves jumps up. Since foreign assets are predetermined at their
initial value, the rise in foreign reserves results in a fall of consumer foreign
bond holdings.
The consumption drop causes a current account surplus because con-
sumption falls below the level of domestic income and therefore the trade
balance improves.
Once the new saddle-path has been reached, the system moves monoton-
ically from A01 to A1 with an accumulation of foreign assets and a rise in
infinitely-lived agents, is responsible for the devaluation neutrality in the Obstfeld (1981)
analysis.
9In Fig. 1, the
.
c= 0 locus is moved downward on the right, while the
.
f= 0 schedule
remains unaltered. This implies that the new long-run equilibrium A1 stays along the
.
f= 0 schedule.
10The vertical translation of the saddle-path, i.e. the impact multiplier of consumption,
is:
dc(0)
d
∼
d
=
η1
ρ
d c
d
∼
d
> 0.
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consumption and real money balances above the pre-shock level.
3.2 A sustained increase in the rate of devaluation
An increase in ε exerts no long-run eﬀects on consumption and the stock
of claims on foreigners. The rise in the inflation rate brings real money
balances down; this fall in m is entirely determined by a decline in the stock
of foreign reserves. Moreover, as f stays unaltered, a change in the mix of
external assets takes place: the fall of r is exactly compensated by a rise in
b. Therefore, in the present experiment money superneutrality holds, despite
the fact that in general money is non-superneutral in finite-lived setups.11
As consumption and foreign assets do not move in the long-run, an unan-
ticipated permanent rise in ε has no dynamic consequences on the economy.
On impact, only a jump fall in foreign reserves and hence a jump re-shuﬄe
in the foreign asset composition take place.
The mechanics of the increase in ε are as follows. The rise in the op-
portunity cost of holding money, by driving the real money demand down,
generates an excess supply of money. The central bank oﬃcially intervenes
in the currency market by selling foreign bonds and shrinking the money
supply; a loss of foreign reserves takes place. There are no eﬀects on nonhu-
man wealth and consumption, as government revenues, and hence transfer
payments, remain invariant because the rise in seigniorage is exactly com-
11In fact, within OLG models, a rise in long-run inflation generates the ”Tobin eﬀect”,
i.e. a positive eﬀect on saving, wealth and capital formation, when consumers are lump-
sum compensated for the inflation tax. See Stockman (1981), and Marini and Van der
Ploeg (1988).
10
pensated by the decline in foreign reserves. Therefore, the redistributive
mechanism across age-heterogeneous generations seen before is not at work
now.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the consequences of currency devaluations,
in levels and rates, within a life-cycle small open economy, operating under a
managed-float exchange-rate regime and free international capital mobility.
Our findings on the exchange-rate policies under perfect capital mobility
are in striking contrast with what is found by Obstfeld (1981) and others, who
instead consider infinite-lived small open economies having intertemporally
dependent preferences. We firstly discover that a once-and-for-all devaluation
is non-neutral for wealth formation and the external balance; as in the case
of international capital immobility considered by Calvo (1981), this type of
devaluation improves the current account, since, on impact, consumption is
driven down. Secondly, we find that an increase in the rate of devaluation is
neutral for saving, the current account balance and nonhuman wealth; only
real money balances and the composition of foreign assets change.
These results are to be ascribed to the fact that, only when a devalu-
ation shift changes lump-sum transfers, does an OLG demographic setup
with no bequests imply an intergenerational redistribution of resources that
alter aggregate saving, consumption and the external balance. This consid-
eration is further strengthened by observing that if the government budget
were balanced through the endogenous adjustment of government spending,
11
both types of devaluations would be neutral for wealth accumulation and the
current account balance.
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APPENDIX
Microeconomics of the consumer-side
This Appendix provides the microeconomic derivation of the aggregate
behavior of consumers, namely equations (1) of the paper.
Assuming that the individual utility is logarithmic in consumption, ci,
and real money balances, mi, at each instant t a consumer born at time
s ≤ t solves the following problem
max
? ∞
t
[α ln ci(s, j) + (1− α) lnmi(s, j)] exp[−(θ + δ)(j − t)]dj (A.1)
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint
d
dt
wi(s, t) = (ρ+ θ)wi(s, t) + yi + τ i(s, t)− (ρ+ ε)mi(s, t)− ci(s, t), (A.2)
and the solvency condition precluding Ponzi schemes
lim
j→∞
wi(j, t) exp[−(ρ+ θ)(j − t)] = 0, (A.3)
where wi(s, t) and τ i(s, t) denote nonhuman wealth and lump-sum transfers
of a consumer born at time s; θ is the mortality rate (exogenous), δ the rate
of time preference (exogenous), ρ the world interest rate (exogenous), yi the
fixed individual nonasset income, and α a positive preference parameter.
The optimality conditions for the individual problem (A.1)-(A.3) are
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ci(s, t) = α(θ + δ)[wi(s, t) + hi(s, t)]
mi(s, t) =
(1− α)ci(s, t)
α(ρ+ ε)
d
dt
ci(s, t) = (ρ− δ)ci(s, t),
where hi(s, t) is the consumer’s human wealth, given by
hi(s, t) =
? ∞
t
[yi + τ i(s, t)] exp[−(ρ+ θ)(j − t)]dj.
Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demand-
side of the model can be expressed as
c = α(θ + δ)(w + h) (A.4a)
m =
(1− α)c
α(ρ+ ε)
(A.4b)
.
h= (ρ+ θ)h− y − τ (A.4c)
.
w= ρw + y + τ − (ρ+ ε)m− c, (A.4d)
where the small letters denote the aggregate variables of the corresponding
individual variables with subscript i; each aggregate variable is defined as
x = x(t) =
? t
−∞
xi(s, t)θ exp[θ(s− t)]ds,
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where xi(s, t) indicates a generic individual variable.
Using equations (A.4), the Blanchard-Yaari equation of motion for con-
sumption can be obtained:
.
c= (ρ− δ)c− αθ(θ + δ)w. (A.4a’)
Thus, as indicated in Section 2 of the paper, the aggregate behavior of
consumers is described by (A.4a’), (A.4b) and (A.4d), once the definition
w = m+ b is employed.
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Figure 1.  Comparative dynamics 
 
 
